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ABSTRACT 
The deeper penetration of variable energy resources (VERs) in the form of wind farms and 
solar photovoltaic systems has impacted power system operations and planning in many ways. 
Today, renewable energy resources constitute a significant portion of new power generation 
capacity additions. As the outputs of renewable generation resources are function of the climatic 
conditions at their geographic locations – and over which the resource operators have no control 
– and the current renewable technologies provide only limited controllability, the renewable 
outputs are subject to, by and large, uncontrollable, rapid and uncertain changes. Such volatility 
in the renewable outputs, that may also include intermittent behavior, can affect power systems 
operations significantly. Indeed, the continual variability impacts introduce new complications 
due to their interactions with the impacts of the continuously changing loads in the system. In 
particular, such interactions may exacerbate the challenge to provide the critical function to 
maintain the supply-demand balance around the clock. Given the limited controllability over the 
renewable resources, system operators have no choice but to impose additional burdens on the 
controllable conventional generation resources. Many of these resources, however, have rather 
slow response times and limited ramping capabilities resulting in less than ideal performance in 
the provision of the second-by-second supply-demand balance – the so-called frequency 
regulation service. This service, also known by the technical term of automatic generation 
control (AGC ), is absolutely essential to maintain the frequency of the power system at its 
nominal value, which is 60 Hz in the United States and 50 or 60 Hz in other countries.  
The recent advancements on the storage technology front indicate great potential in terms 
of applications to power systems for frequency regulation service. A particularly exciting 
development is the integration into the power system of storage devices known as flywheel 
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energy storage (FES). In this thesis, we investigate the effective utilization of FES for frequency 
regulation service provision via the competitive markets for such service. 
The FES utilization in frequency regulation service provision presents a number of 
challenges. A FES unit has a relatively low energy-to-power ratio, a situation that implies a clear 
limitation to its ability to provide frequency regulation over longer periods of time in only a 
single direction. Such a limitation, consequently, constrains the amount of service the FES unit 
can offer. As the frequency regulation service is procured in the competitive environment 
through market mechanisms, the FES physical limitations and the uncertainty associated with the 
second-by-second requirements of the system make the formulation of appropriate offer 
strategies for a FES unit a challenging task. To address all these challenges, we have developed a 
comprehensive approach to effectively utilize the FES to provide guaranteed frequency 
regulation service to the grid. We prepared this thesis to discuss the development of the approach 
and describe its application to various studies. We demonstrate the capability of the developed 
approach and quantify the improved performance over existing techniques through various case 
studies using actual 2011 AGC signal and price data from two large systems – the CAISO and the 
PJM. The representative results clearly indicate that the proposed approach generates offer 
strategies that result in better utilization of FES to provide guaranteed frequency regulation 
service. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
This thesis deals with the utilization of flywheel energy storage for frequency regulation 
service provision. In this chapter, we start by discussing the motivation and background of our 
research to set the stage for the work presented in the thesis. We provide a brief summary of the 
frequency regulation service provision by storage technology and review the prior work in this 
area. Then, we present the scope and the contribution of the work. We end by outlining the 
contents of the chapters that follow. 
 
1.1 Motivation and Background 
 
The deeper penetration of variable energy resources (VERs), such as wind and solar 
photovoltaic, has significantly impacted power systems operations and planning. Today the 
renewable resources already constitute a significant portion of new power generation capacity 
additions. As the outputs of renewable generation resources are determined by climatic 
conditions at their locations and over which the resource operators have no control, and the 
current renewable technologies provide only limited controllability, the renewable outputs are 
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subject to rapid and uncertain changes. Such volatility in the renewable outputs, that may also 
include intermittent behavior, can affect power systems operations significantly and introduce 
additional complications to the impacts of the continuously changing loads in the system. In 
order to maintain the supply-demand balance around the clock, system operators must impose 
additional burdens on the controllable generation resources. Many of these resources, however, 
have rather slow response times and limited ramping capabilities. The recent advancements on 
the storage technology front have great potential in terms of applications to power systems for 
the second-by-second supply-demand balance – the so-called frequency regulation service. This 
service, also known by the technical term of automatic generation control (AGC) is absolutely 
essential to maintain the frequency of the power system at its nominal value. A particularly 
exciting development is the integration into the power system of storage devices known as 
flywheel energy storage (FES). These are compact structures that can range in output from 
250 kW to 20 MW with a storage capability of up to 5 MWh. In this thesis, we investigate the 
effective utilization of FES for AGC service provision in the context of the competitive markets 
for such service.  
The recent studies [1]-[4] investigated the benefit of fast storage for frequency regulation 
by performing the economic analysis and dynamic simulation of ancillary service markets and 
system operations. The studies indicate that fast storage is economically viable for frequency 
regulation. In addition, the grid benefits from the high ramping capabilities and the short 
response times of the regulation providers. In order to speed up the pace of storage adoption for 
the purposes of frequency regulation, the Department of Energy has funded several 
demonstration projects under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). For 
example, Beacon Power with $24 million in funding from ARRA and $48 million of the total 
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project value, has designed and built the 20 MW and 5 MWh flywheel frequency regulation 
plant. The project is intended to put this technology on equal footing with conventional 
regulation providers by demonstrating the physical and economical feasibility of the flywheel 
technology [5]. The plant was commissioned in 2011 in the area of the NewYork ISO and so far 
demonstrates good economic and technical performance. To consolidate this achievement, in the 
beginning of 2013 Beacon Power started to build the flywheel regulation plant with the same 
parameters on the PJM footprint. The flywheel technology is acknowledged for its 
characteristics that make it attractive for the provision of frequency regulation service. 
Specifically, this technology can withstand harsh cyclic requirements of regulation. We can also 
identify following beneficial aspects of flywheels: fast response capability (the regulation storage 
resource based on flywheel technology is able to respond to any AGC signal command within its 
capacity limits), long life time, high round-trip efficiency of 95-98%, low maintenance costs and 
ease of siting. 
The recent push for demonstration projects has been accompanied by a number of policy 
regulations, which goal is to further promote the use of storage technologies in frequency 
regulation provision. All wholesale electricity markets in the United States are overseen by the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), an agency that ensures competitiveness and 
fairness for all parties, operating in the markets. The integration of new technologies into 
frequency regulation provision has been the subject of two FERC orders recently. The major 
stimulus for greater use of the storage came with the FERC Order No.755 released on October 
20, 2011 [6]. Under this order, frequency regulation service providers must be compensated 
using a two-part tariff. The first part is a payment for capacity to operate under AGC signal, i.e., 
a unit must reserve a part of the output for regulation provision. The second part of frequency 
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regulation compensation is the performance payment that reflects the quantity of the up and 
down movements in response to the system operator's AGC dispatch signal. This part accounts 
for the fact that a fast-response resource with a higher ramping rate is more effective in providing 
regulation service than a slow-response resource with a low ramping capability and must be paid 
appropriately. Hence, FERC ensures that Order No. 755 results in more regulation being 
provided by technologies that are faster-responding to the AGC signal and more suitable to 
provide regulation service, while fewer conventional resources will participate in the market. 
Since resources that provide greater benefits to the grid are compensated appropriately, the 
implementation of Order No. 755 will lead to better market efficiency through alignment of 
performance and incentives.  
The subsequent regulatory action indirectly affecting the integration of storage into 
frequency regulation is FERC Order No. 764 released on June 22, 2012 [7]. The order mandates 
to partition the day-ahead market (DAM) scheduling period into shorter-duration subperiods to 
facilitate the integration of VERs and energy-limited resources into energy and ancillary services 
markets. For the storage-based regulation suppliers this order is beneficial since it provides more 
flexibility in allocation of the stored energy in a most effective way. 
The demonstration projects and policy initiatives had demonstrated that FES is a viable 
technology, which can provide regulation service into the grid. Such encouraging results raise a 
question of what is an effective deployment of FES technology for this purpose. This is a precise 
issue we address in the thesis. But, as a first step we discuss the salient aspects of the AGC 
service provision and review the current state of the art in the area of the frequency regulation 
service provision by storage devices, in general, and by FES, in particular. We then follow with a 
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description of the contribution made by the work reported here. Section 1.5 outlines the contents 
of this thesis.  
 
1.2 The Salient Aspects of AGC Service Provision by Storage Technology 
 
AGC service is implemented to control the output of several generators to maintain 
frequency within acceptable bounds and regulate the power interchange between control areas. 
AGC service is one of the ancillary services that are traded in electricity markets running by 
independent system operators (ISOs) and regional transmission organizations (RTOs). The ISOs 
and RTOs, referred in the thesis as independent grid operators (IGOs), purchase the frequency 
regulation service in the DAMs and real-time markets (RTMs) from suppliers which are able to 
respond to the AGC signal by varying their output according to the signal commands. By selling 
certain capacity bandwidth on regulation market, the unit operator implies the responsibility to 
vary the unit’s output under AGC commands within this bandwidth. The scheduled capacity 
output that resulted from the outcome of energy DAMs clearing establishes the baseline rate of 
the unit providing AGC service. If the resource following the AGC commands raises its output 
above the baseline rate, it provides regulation up service. In contrast, if the unit lowers its output 
below baseline rate, it provides regulation down. The IGOs have different approaches in 
procurement of the regulation service. For example, CAISO procures up and down regulation as 
two separate products. On the other hand, PJM considers up and down regulation as a single 
product. In order to facilitate our discussion, we consider regulation in up and down directions as 
two separate products, which are traded separately. Under current policies, all IGOs prohibit the 
energy-limited resources from selling energy. Therefore, storage devices operate with zero 
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baseline rate, which implies that their generation mode is for the regulation up service provision 
and their load mode is for regulation down service. 
 
1.3 Review of the State of the Art in Storage Utilization for Frequency 
Regulation 
 
The question of how to utilize the storage for the frequency regulation service provision 
has been the subject of several papers. In this section we give a brief summary of the literature 
related to the utilization of storage resources in the frequency regulation service provision. A 
very useful and comprehensive survey paper assessing the storage utilization in the AGC service 
provision is by Ibraheem et al. [8]. 
The emergence of new storage technologies over the last two decades pushed the 
researchers to explore the technologies’ compatibility for frequency regulation service provision. 
A number of papers and reports have outlined conceptually what storage technologies fit the 
requirements of AGC service [9]-[13]. For example, Gross and Guille have presented the 
conceptual framework of vehicle-to-grid (V2G) implementation and demonstrated its feasibility 
for regulation service provision [11]. The utilization of superconducting magnetic energy storage 
(SMES) for AGC is introduced in [10]. The recent advancements of battery technology enabled 
the conceptual development of large-scale storage facilities for AGC service provision, which 
has been analyzed in [9], [12], [13]. 
The large majority of the papers related to the AGC service provision by storage 
technologies discuss the modifications in control algorithms that allow accommodation of the 
limited capability of storage technologies [14]-[18]. The decentralized AGC concept deals with 
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storage facilities spread over distantly connected geographical territories [14]. The multilevel 
control concept is used to build a hierarchical structure in the usage of conventional and storage 
AGC providers [15]. 
There is a long history of work on using the fast-acting storage in conjunction with VER 
generation [19]-[24]. Thatte et al. proposed the scheme to coordinate wind generation and FES 
for a provision of grid frequency regulation service [19]. The scheme enables both wind 
generation and FES to collectively respond to the system frequency deviation. It is shown that 
this combination can effectively provide AGC service, however, under certain conditions the 
valuable wind generation can be spilled out due to the limited storage capability of the FES. The 
effect is also observed for aggregation with photovoltaic energy resources [20]. 
After restructuring, the storage facilities are operated as private entities by offering 
regulation capacities in IGO-run ancillary service markets. A number of works has focused on 
strategies to maximize profits from participating in the market [25]-[27]. Researchers from the 
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory have developed a method to generate the DAM offer 
schedule for a hybrid storage system, which includes fast-response FES and slow response hydro 
unit [25]. The strategy aims to maximize profit from energy and frequency regulation provision 
in the wholesale market. The Donadee and Ilic approach to generate the offers into the DAMs for 
frequency regulation and energy bids for charging the aggregated fleet of electric vehicles 
involves the stochastic co-optimization of these services [26]. Their scheme allows the provision 
of both up and down regulation services during the low-load conditions as they assume a non-
zero baseline rate of charging. Hence, if aggregation charges with capacity lower than the 
baseline rate, then it provides regulation down service; in contrast, if aggregation charges with 
capacity above the baseline rate, it provides the regulation up service. Both [25] and [26] are 
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focused on offering services in hourly DAMs, but do not recognize the ample potential from 
participating in RTMs.  
The deployment and successful operation of the FES in the NYISO markets provides 
researchers valuable data on FES performance in the frequency regulation provision. References 
[28]-[30] report the current practice of FES utilization, particularly by analyzing the key 
challenges and disadvantages associated with the FES technology. Engineers are careful to note 
that FES has a relatively low energy-to-power ratio, a situation that implies a clear restriction on 
its ability to provide frequency regulation over longer periods of time and one type of regulation 
needs. Figure 1.1 represents the regulation AGC signal requirements for a typical summer day of 
June 14, 2011 in PJM and the corresponding FES status during this day. The 20 MW and 
5 MWh FES participates on hourly DAMs by offering its full capacity in up and down directions 
and is able to provide regulation only for 62% of the total 24 hours. The remaining time the FES 
was unable to respond to the AGC commands because it had hit the upper or the lower physical 
limit of the energy level. Vu, Masiello, et al. report an unavailability rate as high as 41% [28]. 
The effect is especially unfavorable because the unit cannot contribute regulation during high 
load conditions. The IGO has no choice but to procure regulation services from other resources 
to meet regulation requirements. In order to effectively accommodate the energy-limited 
regulation resources, IGOs are looking for other solutions.  
There are several attempts to deal with the described limitation on FES performance. For 
example, CAISO is implementing the regulation energy management (REM) system for non-
generating resources [31] participating in the regulation market. The REM is based on a smart 
grid system, which controls not only the capacity output of the unit, but also monitors the energy 
level of the storage device. Using the regulation requirements and energy level of each resource 
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that provides regulation service, IGO determines the appropriate AGC signal for each player and 
ensures nonviolation of energy limits. This approach allows for the improvement of the 
regulating units’ performance, but some critics express concerns of grid reliability once the 
number of energy-limited regulation suppliers attains critical mass [32].  
Until now there has been no work which investigates the advantageous characteristics of 
the real-time AGC service market and their possible utilization to improve the performance of 
regulation suppliers. Since the regulation service is a commodity now, deeper understanding of 
how to effectively exploit the market environment is needed. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: PJM regulation requirements and FES status on June 14, 2011 
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The regulation service is crucial for grid reliability, so that the issue of FES effective 
utilization is certainly of interest in the frequency regulation realm. We address in this thesis the 
solution approach of effective utilization of the FES in market environment. In Section 1.4 we 
summarize our proposed approach of effective utilization of the FES in the regulation service 
provision. 
 
1.4 Scope and Contribution of the Thesis 
 
In this thesis, we provide a comprehensive approach for the formulation of offers into the 
DAMs and RTMs with the express objective to effectively utilize FES for the provision of 
regulation service. In our studies we consider a single FES operated by an entity to offer 
regulation services into the IGO-run ancillary service markets. We have analyzed and employed 
the procedures established for storage resources participating in the ancillary service market to 
provide frequency regulation. We explicitly take into account the requirements of the recent 
FERC Orders No. 755 and No. 764. 
Our work makes several contributions to the state-of-the-art. The developed approach of 
FES utilization for the frequency regulation provision allows the FES to provide reliable service 
into the grid. At the heart of our approach is the formulation of strategies with the objective to 
produce the offers into the hourly DAMs and the RTMs around the clock. The strategies are 
formulated as optimization programs with explicit representation of FES limited storage 
capability, response time and capacity limitations. Since the physical considerations are fully 
taken into account and the up-to-date information of FES time-varying variables is available for 
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the RTMs, the robust solution provides a reliable regulation service provision and can handle the 
inherent uncertainties in the AGC signals. 
We demonstrate the capability of the developed approach through a number of case studies 
using AGC signal and year 2011price data from the CAISO and PJM. The test results indicate 
that the strategies formulated by the FES for the DAMs and RTMs are effective in ensuring full 
compliance with AGC signals sent by the IGO. Moreover, the effective utilization of the FES 
results in commensurate increase of FES monthly payment for frequency regulation service 
provision. In our sensitivity studies we investigate the impact of changing the duration of the 
cyclic offer pattern in DAMs and the impact of deployment of the risk-taking offer strategy on 
RTM. Another application of the proposed approach is to the analysis of the impacts of the policy 
changes promulgated by FERC. Specifically, we investigate the impact of the FERC Order 
No. 764 implementation, which mandates to partition hourly DAM periods into shorter 
subperiods. 
The proposed approach for the formulation of offers into the DAMs and RTMs enables the 
FES operator to effectively utilize the regulation unit by providing reliable service in the grid. 
Furthermore, the implemented case studies can help the FES operator to quantify the range of 
benefits and limitations of IGO’s ancillary service market rules and frequency regulation service 
provision procedures. 
 
1.5 Outline of the Thesis 
 
The thesis consists of four additional chapters and three appendices. In Chapter 2 we 
provide a detailed description of the frequency regulation provision framework, which is 
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represented as a three-layer structure of the regulation service provision in the day-ahead and 
real-time markets, and the layer of physical operations under AGC.  
In Chapter 3, we use the proposed framework to construct the FES strategies to offer in 
hourly DAMs and RTMs around the clock. First we provide a general mathematical statement of 
the FES offer strategy in hourly DAMs making use of the DAM market rules and timeline. We, 
next, exploit the regulation provision cyclic behavior to formulate the DAM strategy as a linear 
optimization program. After setting up the necessary assumptions, we construct the FES offer 
strategy into RTMs. We detail all the constraints, imposed as a result of the accepted offers into 
hourly DAMs and the preceding same hour RTMs, and by the limited physical capability of the 
FES.  
In Chapter 4, we describe the results from representative case studies we have carried out 
using the proposed approach and actual 2011 data from the CAISO and PJM. In our studies, we 
investigate the impact of changing the duration of the cyclic offer pattern in DAMs and the 
impact of deployment of the risk-taking offer strategy on RTM. In this chapter, we also analyze 
the impacts of the policy changes promulgated by the FERC. Specifically, we investigate the 
impact of FERC Order No. 764 implementation, which mandates partitioning hourly DAM 
periods into shorter subperiods. 
In Chapter 5, we summarize the results of our studies and point out directions for future 
work. Appendix A provides a summary of notations used in the thesis. In Appendix B, we give 
the procedure to calculate the FES payment for the regulation service provision, taking into 
account the requirements of FERC Order No. 755. In Appendix C, we provide a description of 
the AGC model, incorporated into the three-layer structure, and present an overview of the 
simulation approach.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
MODELING OF FREQUENCY REGULATION SERVICE AND 
CONSTRUCTION OF ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter we describe the development of the analytic framework, which we 
construct for the formulation of the strategies for FES participation in the two sets of markets – 
DAMs and RTMs. We start from the FES modeling to appropriately represent the physical 
characteristics of the unit, the impacts of the market rules and the unit response to the AGC 
signal under actual operating conditions. We continue with an overview of the framework 
structure which includes three layers and provide a detailed description of each layer. 
 
2.1 The Three-Layer Framework of the Regulation Service Provision 
 
The key objective of this chapter is to develop a framework capable to deal with all 
aspects of the regulation service provision by FES such as obligations imposed by participation 
in DAMs and RTMs and obligations to respond to AGC signals under real-time physical 
operations. In order to meet these objectives, a detailed representation of markets and AGC 
control is required. However, there is no single standard market design across the United States 
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and implementation of AGC control also varies. Therefore, in order to accommodate these 
differences, the framework must be stated on the most general basis.  
The developed framework structure, as illustrated in Figure 2.1, has three layers – a layer 
for the offer formulation into the hourly DAMs (DAM layer), another layer for the additional 
offer formulation into RTMs (RTM layer) and a simulation layer of the FES operations in 
response to the AGC signals sent by the IGO to whose system the FES is interconnected (AGC 
physical operations layer). We interconnect these three layers by introducing the information 
flows to represent the interactions between the markets and actual operations under AGC. In 
order to appropriately represent these information flows in Section 2.2 we provide a detailed 
description of the FES model for the frequency regulation service provision. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Three-layer structure of the framework 
 
2.2 The FES Modeling for the Frequency Regulation Service Provision 
 
We consider the parameters of the FES for the frequency regulation service provision. We 
denote by  the maximal ramping rate of the unit. The ramping rate is a  parameter provided  
Mr
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by themanufacturer to indicate the capacity increase/decrease per minute capability of the 
regulation unit. The ramping rate of FES is very high and can attain  ±300 MW/min. 
We next consider the storage capability of the storage regulation unit. We denote by  
the maximum storage capability of the FES in MWh. Based on the manufacturer’s FES 
performance analysis, discharge of the FES to zero stored energy is not recommended, since this 
can exacerbate the unit’s degradation. Therefore, we denote by  the minimal level of stored 
energy the unit can be discharged to during the regulation service provision. The  
designates a maximum capacity of regulation up service and  is a maximum capacity for 
regulation down service. Due to lack of operational experience with limited energy storage 
resources, the existing IGO market rules put certain restrictions on the ability of FES to offer 
energy into the DAM and RTM. As a result, the output base point of the FES for every time 
period is zero. The zero base point implies that the FES operates in generation mode for 
regulation up service provision and in load mode for regulation down service provision. 
A convenient starting point for the FES modeling description is the AGC physical 
operations layer in which we embed the representation of FES operations in response to the AGC 
signals sent by the IGO. Figure 2.2 depicts the functional diagram of the AGC system. Frequency 
is measured and compared with the reference frequency  to generate a signal proportional 
to the frequency deviation  .f  A weighted value of this signal is added to the net tie-line 
interchange error  to produce the area control error (ACE) that corresponds to the power by 
which total generation must be changed in order to maintain frequency and the tie-line power 
interchange at the scheduled values [33]-[38]. The ACE value and DAMs and RTMs results from 
corresponding layers are input data to the energy management system (EMS) which defines the 
contribution of FES to the total frequency control service provision based on RTMs and DAMs 
clearing results and FES physical characteristics. The control algorithm of EMS broadcasts every 
 interval the specific AGC instruction with a command to raise or lower its power output. 
Analyzing the regulation service provision by FES, we consider the  interval as a smallest 
indecomposable unit of time, and no phenomena of shorter duration is considered in our study. 
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Figure 2.2: Functional diagram of the AGC system 
 
We use  to denote the AGC signal instruction. By the adopted convention, 
 is positive when the regulation unit is instructed to increase generation and negative 
when it is instructed to lower generation. We also use  to denote the actual power 
output of the FES at interval  of subperiod in hour h. By the same convention, the 
, when the unit injects energy into the grid (generator mode) and , 
when the unit withdraws energy (load mode). Therefore, the output  in interval  is 
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Figure 2.3 depicts the functional diagram of the FES response to AGC signal instructions. We 
use  to denote the energy charge level at the end of interval  of subperiod  in hour 
h. The output  at interval  is correlated with  at  as follows: 
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Equations (2.1) and (2.2) establish the equations of motion of the FES unit under AGC control. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: The FES response to AGC signal instructions 
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As discussed in Section 1.2, we consider regulation in the up and down directions as two 
separate products. Figure 2.4 represents an example of the FES providing regulation service for 
two hours by illustrating the capacity range over which the unit has to vary its output under the 
given AGC signal. The unit participates in regulation service provision and schedules to provide 
regulation up  and down  in hour h and regulation up  and down  in hour . 
In other words, by providing regulation up service the seller assumes an obligation to vary its 
capacity output under the AGC signal between the zero base point and , and for regulation 
down between 0 and . A similar statement is applicable to hour . It is evident, that the 
FES is constrained by maximum capacity limits in generation  and load modes. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Regulation up and down service provision 
 
After the electric power industry restructuring, frequency regulation became one of the 
ancillary services that must be procured on a competitive basis. Hence, the fleet of units 
participating in regulation is selected up on the clearing of the DAMs and RTMs using market 
mechanisms. In Sections 2.3 and 2.4 we analyze the frequency regulation provision in a market 
  
 h
  
 h
 

 
 1h
 

 
 1h  1h
  
 h
   
 h
 1h
 ,Mp  ,Mp
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environment by considering the DAM and RTM layers of the framework and focusing on offer 
formulation and dependence between two markets.  
 
2.3 Layer for Offer Formulation into the Hourly DAMs 
 
The regulation DAM is a capacity market operated by the IGO. Every AGC service seller 
indicates willingness to sell the service by submitting an offer to the IGO. Offers specify the sale 
quantities and prices. Unlike an energy market, where the demand is determined by equilibrium 
of demand and supply curves, the total regulation requirements for every hourly DAM are 
determined by IGO as a percentage of the total load forecast [39]-[40]. Figure 2.5 depicts the 
timeline of the regulation DAM. All sellers, willing to participate on DAMs of day d, must submit 
their offers for each hour h in day d by 10 a.m. of day . Under existing market rules, the 
IGO determines the outcome of the DAM by co-optimizing energy and ancillary services markets 
so that energy, regulation and spinning reserve requirements are met in the most economic 
manner. At 12 p.m. of day , the IGO informs all regulation sellers cleared to provide 
service about the uniform clearing prices and the awarded capacity. The participants cleared on 
the DAM have an obligation for provision of regulation between 12 a.m. and 11:59:59 p.m. of 
day d. 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Regulation DAM timeline 
 1d
 1d
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By 10 a.m. on day  the regulation service seller submits the offer decision  for 
every hour h in . In order to comply with FERC Order No. 755, which requires the IGO to 
account for the performance of the regulation provision, the offer  must include the 
following components and can be represented as 
    (2.3) 
We denote by  ( ) the offer capacity price for regulation up (down) on DAM at hour h, 
and by the offer mileage price on DAM at hour h. As a result of market clearing, every 
frequency regulation service provider receives back information regarding the capacities it is 
cleared to provide and capacity  and mileage  clearing prices, which are uniform for 
all cleared participants. IGO can clear not all the capacity offered for regulation but only part of 
it, so that following inequalities hold: 
 
 
Based on the market outcome information the seller is obligated to follow AGC 
instructions within an established capacity range, bounded by  and , and receive payment 
based on uniform clearing prices 28 days after the regulation service provision. The settlement 
scheme and equations to quantify the seller’s payment are given in Appendix B.  
 
2.4 Layer for Additional Offer Formulation into RTMs 
 
Regulation RTM is a rolling market, run by IGO every subperiod . The objective of 
regulation RTM is the procurement of additional regulation requirements arising in nearer-to-
real- time operations. In this section we discuss the mechanics of regulation RTM we exploit in 
developing the formulation of the RTM offer strategy.  
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On a regulation RTM we define a subperiod  to be a smallest indecomposable unit of 
time. We use a subscript  after a variable to represent the subperiodic RTM quantities. 
According to each IGO’s rules, regulation service sellers indicate their willingness to participate 
on RTM by submitting the offer , whose components are similar to the components of the 
offer into a DAM in (2.3), but apply to only interval : 
 
The offer  must be submitted during the subperiod , as depicted on the RTM timeline 
shown in Figure 2.6. After RTM clearing, IGO publishes the information regarding clearing 
prices  and FES regulation capacity rewards . 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Regulation RTM timeline 
 
The combined effect of cleared DAM and RTM results necessitates the addition of 
regulation capacities from both markets. We denote by  ( ) the combined regulation up 
(down) capacity on subperiod  in hour h. Since the combined regulation capacity for each 
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individual regulation unit results from participating in both the DAM and the RTM, we define the 
combined regulation up capacity as 
 
and the combined regulation down capacity as 
 
        
 ,   ,k kh h h
 
To explain the concept, we provide a graphical diagram on Figure 2.7 to indicate the impact of 
the regulation up and down provision on both DAMs and RTMs. Regulation up  and down 
 capacities cleared on DAMs form the hour-long capacity range around a zero base point to 
operate under AGC signal. Additionally, every RTM subperiod the regulation resource is 
obligated to widen the capacity range for regulation up by  and down by resulting from 
the accepted RTM offer.  
According to the IGO’s market rules, the maximal combined offer is constrained by 
maximal capacity output of the unit in the generation and the load modes: 
 
 
On the other hand, the minimal capacity offer for the regulation market is constrained by the 
minimal capacity offer in up  and down  directions, specified in IGO’s market rules: 
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Figure 2.7: Combined DAM and RTM regulation capacity for 10 RTM subperiods of hour h 
 
2.5 Summary 
 
In this chapter we have developed the comprehensive framework for the offer strategies 
formulation in the two sets of markets – DAMs and RTMs. The framework incorporates the 
regulatory, financial and physical considerations of frequency regulation service provision by 
a FES unit, as well as their interactions, together with the analytical basis for the formulation of 
offers in compliance with the specified market rules. The developed framework structure has 
three layers – a layer for the offer formulation into the hourly DAMs, another layer for the 
additional offer formulation into the RTMs and a simulation layer of FES operations in response 
to the AGC signals sent by the system operator into whose system the FES is integrated. We have 
also discussed the FES modeling to appropriately represent the physical characteristics of the 
24 
 
unit, the impacts of the market rules and the unit response to the AGC signal under actual 
operating conditions. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE FES OFFER STRATEGY FORMULATION 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter we apply the developed framework to construct the FES offer strategies 
formulation into the DAMs and RTMs. These two markets operate on different timescales, 
involve different levels of granularity, and differ in the time at which the market decisions are 
taken. Under these conditions, we may decouple the offer problem into two subproblems of offer 
regulation service on DAMs and RTMs independently. As a FES unit is a profit maximizing 
entity, the goal of the FES unit operator is to maximize the quantity of service provision so as to 
assure a steady stream of return on its investment. In order to meet objectives of FES 
participation in the frequency regulation market, the offer strategy formulations are stated as 
constraint optimization problems with a representation of the inter-temporal evolution of the 
storage in the FES.  
The chapter contains three sections. In Section 3.1 we develop the offer strategy on hourly 
DAMs in most general terms and state it as a bilinear optimization problem. Next, in Section 3.2 
we make use of periodicity of the frequency regulation provision cycle, so as the offer strategy is 
stated as a linear program. Section 3.3 presents the offer strategy on RTM. 
 
 
26 
 
3.1  Offer Regulation Service Strategy Formulation into the DAMs 
 
In this section we provide a mathematical statement of the FES offer strategy formulation 
into the hourly DAMs making use of the DAM structure with the timeline as specified in 
Chapter 2.  
By 10 a.m. of day  1d  the FES operator must make offer decision   
ˆ
h  for every hour h in 
 . The determination of set     ˆ ,h h   consists of following steps: 
1. determination of the hours when the FES has willingness to provide regulation 
service 
2. determination of the type of regulation (up, down or both) to provide if the FES is 
willing to offer the service in that hour 
3. determination of the capacity in MW for each regulation service in hour h 
4. determination of capacity and mileage price offers for each regulation service in 
hour h 
On a DAM, we consider an hour to be a smallest indecomposable unit of time. As such, if 
FES chooses to provide regulation in hour h, then it has to operate under the AGC signal during 
the entire hour h. We denote by 
 
 hu  the binary variable, which indicates the willingness to 
provide any regulation in hour h: 
 
 
1     if   provides regulation service in hour 
0     otherwise
h
FES h
u

 

 
Next, we denote by 
 
 hu

 (
 
 hu

) the binary variable, indicating the willingness to provide regulation 
up (down) in hour h: 
 
 
1     if   provides regulation up service in hour 
0     otherwise
h
FES h
u 

 
  
    
 
 
1     if   provides regulation down service in hour 
0     otherwise
h
FES h
u 

 

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We can establish the following relationships between these binary variables: 
  
   1       1h h hu u u
      
It indicates that if FES offers frequency regulation service at least in one direction then it is 
under AGC for the entire hour h. On the other hand, if FES does not offer any regulation, then it 
is not under AGC and can use this hour to offer the service into the RTMs and move its storage 
energy charge to a pre-specified value.  
According to the IGO’s market rules, if a regulation provider offers AGC service into the 
DAM then the capacity must be greater than the minimum capacity offer in the up 
 ,mp  and 
down 
 ,mp  directions, which quantities are stipulated by IGO, and less than the FES physical 
upper capacity limit in charging 
 ,Mp  and discharging  ,Mp modes. Hence, for those hours when 
FES offers any type of regulation on DAM (
 
 1hu  ), we state the following capacity offer 
constraints and relate them to corresponding binary variables: 
 ,   ,  
  
ˆ 1m Mh hp p u
           (3.1) 
 ,   ,  
  
ˆ 1m Mh hp p u
           (3.2) 
For an hour in which FES does not offer up (down) regulation service, the corresponding binary 
variable 
 
 hu

 (
 
 hu

) is set equal to zero. The Figure 3.1 depicts the offer decision diagram. 
Next, we discuss the energy constraints, imposed by the FES limited energy capability. 
Since the AGC signal indicates the demand-supply imbalance in real time, the actual shape of the 
AGC curve is not known ahead of its determination. Therefore, the FES operator does not have 
information of the exact value of stored energy at the end of an hour h when the unit offers 
regulation service. The energy constraints are specified in terms of the upper and lower bounds 
of the storage unit capability. We denote for the end of the hour h the upper and lower bounds of 
stored energy by 
 h
e  and 
  h
e , respectively. Moreover, if the unit does not offer the regulation 
service in hour h DAM, it uses this hour h to recharge the FES to pre-specified charge rate  0
 he . 
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Figure 3.1: Offer decision-making diagram 
 
To establish inter-hour relationships of FES energy charge, we need to consider all 
possible realizations of the AGC signal over the period of the offer. This task involves an 
enormous amount of work. In order to simplify the problem, we may only consider those AGC 
signal realizations which move the FES charge toward boundary conditions. Since the main 
feature of the proposed offer strategy is a FES guaranteed capability to provide regulation service 
under every possible realization of AGC signal, the boundary conditions of AGC can establish 
the FES energy charge bounds, hence, significantly simplifying the problem. Figure 3.2 depicts a 
possible AGC realization and the associated energy charge in the FES that results. The upper 
(lower) energy bound at the end of hour h is calculated based on assumption that unit was 
charging (discharging) with a capacity  
 h
  (  
 h
 ) during the entire hour h. 
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At the end of the hour h, during which the FES offers regulation capacity, the upper bound 
on its stored energy is determined under the assumption that the AGC signal commands the FES 
to provide regulation down service with capacity  
 
ˆ
h
  throughout the hour: 
 

   
  1  ˆh h h
e e      (3.3) 
The lower bound of stored energy is determined under the analogous assumption that the AGC 
signal commands the FES to provide regulation up service with capacity   
 ˆh
 throughout the 
hour: 
 

   
    1  ˆh h h
e e
     
(3.4) 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: A possible AGC signal with its impact on the associated FES energy charge and 
the “worst-case” boundary limits 
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The equations (3.3) and (3.4) are applicable for the hour h, during which the FES provides 
regulation. For the case that the FES does not provide regulation service in hour h, the FES 
moves its stored energy to a pre-specified value  0
 h
e . To capture both these possibilities, we use 
binary variable  
 h
u  in the energy constraint formulation, which introduces cross-hourly coupling 
in the hourly DAMs: 
         0    1    ˆ 1h h h h h he e u e u  
          0      1     ˆ 1h h h h h he e u e u  
The hourly energy bounds are also constrained by the FES’s upper and lower physical energy 
storage limits: 
 
 
 
  
M
h
m
h
e E
e E


 
The objective of the offer problem is to maximize the FES revenues for the regulation 
service provision. As such, we formulate the objective function as follows: 
         

            
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) =
H
h h h h h h
h
f w w
 
where 
 
 h
w  and  
 h
w  are the weighting coefficients that reflect the hourly capacity prices of the 
day d, based on price forecasts or past historical data.  
In summary, we denote the inter-hourly energy constrained DAM regulation service offer 
problem by    and state it as follows: 
max
 
 
   
   

  
 

    
    
 
    
    
    ˆ ˆ
, , , , 1
    
    , ,
ˆ ˆ
 
h h h h
h h h
H
h h h h
u u h
u e e
w w  
subject to 
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The optimal solution to    is specified by the set    ,hu h  , which indicates the hours 
in which to regulation service is provided (
 
 1hu  ) and the hours in which the FES does not 
participate in the regulation service provision (
 
 0hu  ) so as to allow it to have the stored energy 
at the pre-specified value at the end of the hour h, the sets    ,hu h    and    ,hu h   , 
which indicate the types of regulation service provided in each hour h in   in which the FES 
offers regulation service and the values of 
 
 
ˆ
h

 and 
 
 
ˆ
h

, which determine the offer amount in 
hour h. Note that all these quantities are the components of the set     ˆ ,h h  . With regard to 
offer prices, we assume that each FES is a price taker and so submits offers with zero prices 
     
  
ˆ ˆ 0
h h
 and  
 ˆ
0
h
 for h  in  . In addition, there are the associated sets   ,he h   
and    ,he h   of upper and lower energy bounds for every hour h in  . We use these sets 
to impose the energy constraints in the RTM offer problem formulation.  
The problem statement above is in its general form and cannot be solved analytically as it 
involves the solution of a bilinear mixed-integer optimization problem and is intractable for 
24H  . In Section 3.2 we make use of the salient characteristics of energy limited frequency 
regulation units and features of frequency regulation DAM to formulate a linear optimization 
problem and state the conditions to determine its optimal solution.  
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3.2  DAMs Regulation Offer Strategy Formulated as a Linear Program 
 
In order to simplify the DAM offer problem    , we wish to exploit the fact that the 
alternation of   hours when the unit provides regulation service in both the up and the down 
directions (
 
 1,   1, 2, ...,hu h   ) and hour 1   when the unit does not participate in regulation 
provision (
 
1 0u    ) constitutes a cycle. We provide in Figure 3.3 the graphical illustration of 
regulation service provision patterns for 1, 2, ..., 5   and the assumption that 24H   is an hour 
in which the FES does not participate in the regulation service provision. The hours in which the 
FES provides regulation service are crosshatched. Each 1   hour cycle schedule has FES 
participation in the DAMs for the first   hours and no participation in hour 1  . Moreover, for 
the transition to the next-day DAMs, the FES does not participate in the hour 24 DAM. This latter 
constraint may shorten the last cycle duration. For example, for 5   the FES participates at the 
hours 1-5, 7-11, 13-17, 19-23. The FES does not participate in the hours 6, 12, 18 and 24.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Regulation service provision patterns for 1, 2, ..., 5   with 24H   designated as an 
hour for no participation in the regulation service 
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Based on initial charge 
 0
 1
e   at the beginning of the cycle and characteristics of FES, we can 
quantify the cycle of   hours which guarantees at least minimum capacity offers 
 ,mp  and  ,mp  
for every hour h. In other words, we need to choose a value for   which ensures that the FES is 
capable of providing both types of regulation for the entire   hours. 
We use the following procedure to check the feasibility of   for a given 
 0
 1
:e   
1. Specify the upper and lower bounds of stored energy at the end of   hours. If there are no 
other restrictions, we choose them to be an upper 
 ME  and lower  mE  energy limits of the 
regulation unit. 
2. If 
  0
 1
 ,
M
m
E e
p




  or 
 0  
 1
 ,
m
m
e E
p




 , then   is not feasible and any '   is also not feasible. 
3. If 
  o
 1
 ,
M
m
E e
p




 and 
 o  
 1
 ,
m
m
e E
p




 , then   is feasible. 
Once   is determined, we next define the set of the hours in which the FES participates in 
the offer of regulation service in the DAM: 
 
          1, 2, ..., , 2, ..., 2 1, 2 , 2 2, ..., 1H
 
 
Now we can proceed to the statement of the optimization problem with the objective to 
maximize the capacity revenues over the set . We denote the inter-hourly energy constrained 
offer problem by  and state it as follows:  
 
 
subject to 
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The optimal solution to     is specified by the set of the values of   h   and   h  , which 
determine the offer amount into the DAM for  h  , and the sets  and 
   ,he h    of upper and lower energy bounds for every h in . The problem     is 
formulated as a linear program and, hence, can be easily solved by well-known methods. 
 
3.3 Offer Regulation Service Strategy Formulation into the RTMs 
 
In this section we develop the formulation of the FES offer strategy for regulation service 
in the RTMs associated with the hour h DAM. We employ the outcomes of the hour h DAM as 
the basis to determine the real-time offers into an associated RTM. Specifically, the DAM results 
establish constraints on the FES offers into an associated RTM. Given that the DAM capacity 
awards 
 
 h

 and 
 
 h

, we identify two distinct cases depending on the 
 
 h

 and 
 
 h

 values. The 
first case covers those hours  in which the FES offer for regulation service is accepted in 
whole or in part. The second case is for the set    ' ,  ,  h h h     in which the FES 
does not offer regulation service into the DAM and moves its charge to a specified value.  
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Figure 3.4: Energy constraints that must be satisfied in the formulation of the RTM offer 
 
We consider first the formulation of the RTM offer strategy for hours  and so the 
unit has the obligation to provide regulation service into the DAM. In light of the analysis of the 
IGO rules discussed in Section 2.4, we adopt the following offer protocols. The FES operator 
makes the offer decision  for the subperiod k  of hour h, which must be submitted at the end 
of subperiod 2k  , as shown in Figure 2.6. Similar to the offer strategy into the DAMs, we 
assume the regulation seller is a pricetaker in the RTMs and so submits the capacity and mileage 
prices to be 
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In order to be able to submit the offer by the deadline, the FES operator starts to formulate its 
offer at the end of subperiod 3k  , as indicated in Figure 2.6. At that time, the FES seller has the 
following information: 
 energy charge

3 , kh
s  at the end of subperiod 3k   in hour h 
 the capacity awards after clearing the hour h DAM, specifically   
 h
 and   
 h
, which are 
constant over the entire hour h 
 RTM awards 




2
 
 , kh
 and 




2
 
 , kh
for subperiod 
2k  
 FES operator’s capacity offers  and for subperiod
1k
 
 the lower bound 
  h
e and the upper bound 
  h
e  of the stored energy at the end of hour h 
 
This information serves to formulate the following constraints (Figure 3.4): 
 the allowed capacity range  to participate in response to the AGC 
signals sent in the subperiod 2k   limits the combined DAM and RTM awards of either 
service 
 
 
  
 
   
2 2
   
 ,   ,k kh h h
 
 
  
 
   
2 2
   
 ,   ,k kh h h
 
 at the end of subperiod  3k   the RTM for subperiod  1k   is unknown but the allowed 
capacity range 
 
 
 
  
 1 1
  
 ,  ,
;  
k kh h
 to participate in response to the AGC signals during 
the subperiod  1k   limits the combined DAM award and the RTM offer amount in 
period  1k  :  
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 the lower and upper bounds of the stored energy in the subperiod 2k   in terms of the 
charge 

3 , kh
s  and the combined capacity awards for up service 




2
 
 , kh
 and down service




2
 
 , kh
 regulation in subperiod 2k  : 
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 the lower and upper bounds of the stored energy in the subperiod 1k   in terms of the 
period 2k   bounds    
  
 
2 2 2 ,  ,  ,k k kh h h
s , the combined DAM award and period 1k 
accepted RTM offer: 
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 the lower and upper bounds of the stored energy in the subperiod in terms of the 
allocated energy range restricted by 
  h
e  and 
  h
e  in hour h and the obligations entailed 
by the hour h DAM clearing results taking into account that there are K k  remaining 
subperiods in hour h: 
  
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 the constraints imposed by the upper and the lower stored energy bounds in the 
subperiods 
k
 and 
1k
 on the real-time offers  and :  
 
 
 the impacts of the constraints of the FES maximum capacity output in the charging and 
discharging modes 
 ,Mp and  ,Mp , respectively, and those of the minimum capacity 
offer 
 ,mp  and  ,mp : 
 
 
 
 
We denote the formulation of the DAM outcome constrained RTM offer problem for subperiod 

k
 in hour h   as 
  ( )kh   and state it as follows: 
 
subject to  
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The optimal solution to   ( )kh   is specified by the set of the values of 
 
 ,
ˆ
kh
 and 

  
 ,
ˆ
kh
, which 
determine the offer amount into the RTM for subperiod k of hour 
h  . 
We next consider the RTM offer strategy for the hours  'h  , in which the unit does not 
participate in the offer of regulation service into the DAMs. Rather, in such hours, the FES 
moves its charge to be at a pre-specified value of 
 0
 he . The RTM regulation timeline is the same as 
depicted in Figure 2.6. A significant advantage of flywheel technology is the relatively high 
ramping rate and so the FES can charge or discharge to attain a pre-specified value 
 0
 he  within no 
more than a few real-time subperiods. We denote by   the number of real-time subperiods, used 
by the FES to charge or discharge. For the remaining K  subperiods of hour   1  in the 
cycle, the FES may participate in regulation service provision and so offers its capacity into 
those RTMs without being constrained by the hour   1  DAM clearing outcomes. Moreover, the 
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FES regulation RTM offer for subperiod 
k
 is constrained only by the obligations to provide 
service in the preceding subperiods 
1k
 and 
2k
. These facts allow us to formulate the 
following constraints: 
 the lower and upper bounds of the stored energy in the subperiod 2k   in terms of the 
charge 

3 , kh
s  and the real-time capacity awards for up service 




2
 
 , kh
 and down service 




2
 
 , kh
 regulation in subperiod 2k  : 
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 the lower and upper bounds of the stored energy in the subperiod 1k   in terms of the 
period 2k   bounds    
  
 
2 2 2 ,  ,  ,k k kh h h
s  and submitted RTM offer in subperiod 
1 :k   
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 the lower and upper bounds of the stored energy in the subperiod in terms of the 
physical energy limits of the FES taking into account that there is no DAM clearing in 
hour   1 :  
  
  
 ,  ,  ,k k kh h h
s
 

   
 , k
m
h
E  

   
 , k
M
h
E  
 the constraints imposed by the upper and the lower stored energy bounds in the 
subperiods 
k
 and 
1k
 on the real-time offers  and :  
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We denote the formulation of the RTM offer problem for subperiod 
k
 in hour   'h   as 

 '
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h k 
  and state it as follows: 
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The optimal solution to 
 '
( )
h k 
  is specified by the set of the values of 

  
 ,
ˆ
kh
 and 

  
 ,
ˆ
kh
, which 
determine the offer amount into the RTM for subperiod 
k
in hours   'h  . 
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3.4 Summary 
 
In this chapter we have introduced the formulation of the offer strategies for the regulation 
service provision into the DAMs and the RTMs. The statement of the formulation may be 
expressed as a linear program with the explicit representation of the inter-temporal evolution of 
the storage in the FES. The solution approach for this optimization problem makes extensive use 
of robust optimization concepts to determine the offer amounts of up and down regulation to 
service in each market for its corresponding period. These solutions provide conservative results 
under which both up and down regulation can be provided with 100% guarantee, independent of 
what the AGC signal turns out to be and taking into account the most up-to-date information on 
unit status up to the time an offer must be submitted. In Chapter 4, we apply this approach to 
obtain via simulation the results of representative studies in order to quantify the economics of 
the FES participation in the regulation service provision. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
CASE STUDIES 
 
 
 
 
We devote this chapter to demonstrate the capability of the DAM and RTM offer strategy 
formulation approach and quantify the improved performance over current techniques through 
various case studies using actual 2011 AGC signal and price data from two large systems – the 
CAISO and PJM. Our studies include the investigations of the impacts of changing the duration 
of the cyclic offer pattern into the DAMs. We also study the impacts of the deployment of risk-
taking offer strategies into the RTMs. A very insightful application of the proposed approach is 
the analysis of policy issue impacts. We illustrate such an application through a study of the 
changes promulgated by FERC in its Order No. 764 to mandate the partition of each hourly 
DAM period into shorter subperiods. 
We begin the chapter by describing the scope and nature of the simulations carried out for 
the set of representative studies discussed in this chapter. We then proceed to present our results 
and findings obtained from the case studies. We conclude the chapter with a summary of the key 
results.  
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4.1 Scope and Nature of the Simulation 
 
In this section, we present a brief description of the test system and provide an overview of 
the various applications of the proposed methodology presented in Chapter 3 to construct DAM 
and RTM offer strategies for frequency service provision. The representative case studies 
presented serve to illustrate the capabilities of the methodology.  
The results we present in the chapter are drawn from the case studies performed using PJM 
and CAISO control signal data and price information with the provision of regulation service by 
a 20 MW FES with 5 MWh storage capability. Since the regulation service is procured by the 
IGO on a zonal basis, we do not consider the topology of the grid and assume that all the energy 
produced by the FES can be absorbed by the grid and the grid has the capability to supply the 
energy charged by the FES in the provision of down regulation. This assumption is reasonable 
given a large system and a limited capacity/capability FES. All our studies are performed under 
the assumption of perfect knowledge of AGC signal and are totally deterministic in nature. 
The deepening penetration of VERs integrated into the grid has driven federal policy, 
which aims to encourage the further implementation of VERs in the most effective way  
[41]-[42]. Recently FERC issued Order No. 764 with the mandate to require IGOs to implement 
intra-hour scheduling changes, i.e., to partition hourly DAM periods into smaller subperiods. The 
shorter DAM subperiods introduce certain benefits from the utilization of additional 
meteorological data for wind and solar generation forecasting due to the higher time resolution. 
For energy-limited storage resources providing frequency regulation service, the introduction of 
sub-hourly DAM subperiods allows the more cost-effective allocation of the unit’s limited energy 
capability. The simulation approach is constructed by making use of the simulation layer of the 
framework and has the capability to perform the FES economic studies by varying the duration 
of the DAM period. These studies allow the identification of the optimal duration of the DAM 
period for the effective utilization of the FES unit in frequency service provision. 
The FES operator’s offer decision into the DAMs impacts the RTM offers for the entire 
day d. The alternative to the offer of more capacity into the DAMs is the additional offer of 
regulation capacity into the RTMs and the reverse. In order to determine the optimal combination 
of day-ahead and real-time offers, we need to perform an economic assessment of various DAM 
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offer strategies with different durations of the cycle offer pattern  . Such studies can help to 
identify the most effective regulation offer strategy into the DAMs.  
The offer strategies into the hourly DAMs and associated RTMs formulated in Chapter 3 
are made under the “worst-case scenario” assumption for the provision of a single type of 
regulation service over the entire duration of the period covered by a submitted offer. These 
strategies provide conservative results under which both up and down regulation can be provided 
with 100% assurance independent of what the AGC signal turns out to be. This very conservative 
approach does not take into account the inherent uncertain characteristics of the AGC signals. 
The nature of frequency regulation service has been the subject of several studies. The study 
done by Oak Ridge National Laboratory investigates the mean value of AGC requirements over 
different time durations [1]. It reports that, in most cases, the long-term mean value of the AGC 
curve is in the zero value neighborhood. In light of this finding, we may use a more risky 
approach in the formulation of the RTM capacity offers. In other words, we first scale up the 
regulation capacity offers, calculated as a result of the proposed approach to determine the real-
time offer capacity values: 
 +  +
 ,  ,k kh h
q    
  
 ,  ,k kh h
q  
   
where q is an augmentation factor > 1. We next examine the economic impacts of such 
augmented RTM capacity offers.  
 
4.2 Case Studies Results and Sensitivity Analysis 
 
In this section, we discuss the case study results with the two test data sets from CAISO 
and PJM. In order to analyze the differences across the seasons, we disaggregate the FES 
revenues for frequency regulation service provision on a seasonal basis with the months of June, 
July and August as the summer period, the months of September, October and November as the 
fall period, the months of December, January and February as the winter period and the months 
of March, April and May as the spring period. As a reference case for each system we take the 
existing offer strategy when the FES participates only in hourly DAMs in which it offers its full 
capacity to provide up and down regulation services. 
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Figure 4.1 depicts the average total monthly revenues for capacity in the frequency 
regulation service provided in each season with different DAM offer patterns. Specifically, we 
change the duration of the cycle offer parameter   from 1 to 5. Every monthly payment is 
represented as a sum of the DAM and the RTM revenues. We note, that if the FES provides 
service using conventional offer strategy (the reference case), then all payments are calculated 
based on day-ahead regulation prices. In contrast, if the unit offers service only into RTMs 
(“RTM only” case), then the revenues are calculated based on RTM prices. For all other cases 
considered in the study, the total revenues are the sum of the RTM and the DAM revenues.  
From Figure 4.1, we see that for all four seasons the average monthly capacity payment 
decreases monotonically as the offer cycle   increases. The highest increase in monthly capacity 
revenue is for the offer strategy with 1   in all four seasons. Compared to the base case this 
strategy provides up to a 4.6% of increase in the monthly revenues. Any increase of   obtains no 
improvements in either the CAISO test system or in the PJM test system. The “RTM only” offer 
strategy provides revenue growth for the winter months of 2.2%, but in the summer, fall, and 
spring months, we observe revenue reductions of 2.7%, 0.8%, and 2.4%, respectively.  
In Figure 4.2, we plot the monthly mileage payments for different DAM strategies in the 
four seasons. We observe increases in the monthly mileage payments under the offer strategy 
with 1   in the summer and the winter seasons of 4.2 and 6.3%, respectively, with respect to 
the reference case. On the other hand, for the “RTM only” strategy, there is a mileage payment 
increase for all seasons. The deployment of this strategy provides revenue growth of 4.4, 2.8, 5 
and 6.1% for the summer, fall, winter, and spring seasons, respectively, compared with the 
reference case values. In general, the capacity revenues and mileage payments behave in a 
similar manner due to the fact that capacity revenues compensate capacity bandwidth of the 
regulation unit dedicated to provide regulation, i.e., to follow AGC signal instructions. As more 
capacity is provided by the FES, the larger the shifts are that the unit needs to perform. Hence, 
the mileage payment increases is a consequence. 
Next, we explore the seasonality effect on the FES total monthly revenues. The highest 
payment for regulation service provision occurs in the summer season. The reason for this is that 
the summer load is considerably higher than that in the other three seasons. Increases in load 
cause more volatility in the load-generation balance, consequently the FES is instructed to 
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provide more regulation resulting in additional revenues. This finding holds for both the CAISO 
and the PJM test systems.  
 
 
Figure 4.1: The average total monthly revenues for capacity of the delivered frequency 
regulation service for the CAISO test system 
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Figure 4.2: The average monthly mileage payments from regulation service in the DAMs and the 
RTMs in the CAISO test system 
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In Figure 4.3 we depict the FES total monthly revenues for those offer strategies in which 
we observe an increase in revenues. The total monthly revenues consist of capacity revenues, 
mileage payments and payments or charges for supplied or consumed energy. In these studies, 
we do not include the energy payments or charges because their fraction in total payment never 
exceeds 0.2%. From Figure 4.3 we see that an offer strategy with 1   results in increases in 
FES monthly revenues on 3.3, 3.2, 4.9 and 2.7% for the summer, fall, winter, and spring seasons, 
respectively, with reference to the conventional approach. Moreover, for the winter season, we 
observe the increase in the FES revenues of 2.1 and 2.8% for the DAM strategy with 2   and 
“RTM only” offer strategies, respectively, with reference to the conventional case.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: The monthly total revenues for regulation service in the CAISO test system 
 
In Section 4.1, we discussed the FERC Order No. 764 obligation on the IGOs to partition 
the hourly DAM periods into shorter intervals. This order impacts FES regulation service 
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providers with benefits since with the shorter duration subperiods, the provider manages its 
stored energy more effectively. However, there is the lingering question as to the most beneficial 
duration of the DAM period for the FES frequency regulation service provision. In order to 
answer this question we performed an extensive sensitivity study on the DAM period duration. 
To illustrate the impact of a DAM period reduction, we depict in Figures 4.4–4.6 the total 
monthly regulation service provider revenues with DAM period durations of 15, 20, and 30 
minutes under different service provision cycles  . The conventional offer strategy serves as the 
reference for the analysis of simulation results. For a 15-minutes DAM period, the peak monthly 
revenues are obtained with the cycle 3  . Smaller   values result in lower revenues because of 
less effective FES stored energy utilization. On the other hand, for 3   the limited FES storage 
capability limits the unit ability to offer more capacity on regulation into the DAMs. Therefore, 
the monthly revenues decrease. For 20- and 30-minute DAM periods, the monthly revenues are 
higher for 1  , as illustrated in Figures 4.5 and 4.6. These results are commensurate with those 
obtained for case studies with hourly periods, but since we have the finer granularity for 
regulation provided in the DAMs, the monthly revenues increase above the reference case levels 
obtained with one-hour DAM periods.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Total monthly FES revenues under 15-minute DAM periods 
51 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Total monthly FES revenues under 20-minute DAM periods 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Total monthly FES revenues under 30-minute DAM periods 
 
From this discussion we conclude that the FES can benefit from the reduced duration DAM 
period. The DAM period duration of 15 minutes combined with appropriate DAM offer strategy 
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3   provides the largest increase in monthly revenues. For the 20- and 30-minute DAM 
periods, the revenue increases are smaller, but are still above those in the reference case.  
We next investigate the impacts on FES monthly revenues of the deployment of risk-taking 
offer strategies into the RTMs. In our studies we parametrized the augmentation factor q to 
calculate FES total revenues for a given value of  . Figure 4.7 depicts the plot of the FES total 
monthly revenues for 1   and 2  . The plots for 3, 4 and 5   are not of interest, since the 
total monthly revenues are below those in the reference case. From Figure 4.7 we see that for 
1   with 100% 160%q  , as q increases the monthly total revenues increase. This means 
that the benefits from the additional capacity of the offer exceed the revenue losses from the 
inability to respond to AGC signals due to hitting a storage capability limit. If we increase q 
above 160% we obtain no revenue increases because of the reduction in the number of   
intervals when the FES is responsive to AGC signals. Such a reduction causes the decrease in 
capacity revenues and mileage payments, and, therefore, in the total revenues.  
We see that the choice of q involves a trade-off: q needs to be large enough to have an 
impact on capacity revenues and mileage payments, but also needs to be sufficiently small to 
avoid hitting a storage capability limit during regulation service provision. We obtain a similar 
plot for 2   with peak monthly revenues with 170%q  . 
In order to obtain a better representation of the relationaship between q and monthly 
revenues, we display the q sensitivity for 150% 170%q   under 1   in Figure 4.8. We see 
that the peak monthly revenues of $353,403 corresponding to the RTM capacity offer 
augmentation by 63%. In this case, we have an increase in monthly revenues of $30,867, which 
is a meaningful amount for a FES service provider.  
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Figure 4.7: Total FES revenues for RTM capacity offer augmentation over the 
110% 200%q   with 1   and 2 
 
Figure 4.8: Total FES revenues for RTM capacity offer augmentation over the
150% 170%q   with 1   
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4.3 Summary 
 
In this chapter we demonstrated the ability of the proposed formulation for the offer 
strategies into DAMs and their associated RTMs through representative case studies using the 
actual 2011 year AGC signals and the price data from two large systems – the CAISO and the 
PJM. Studies show that the offer strategies formulated for the FES participation in the DAMs and 
the RTMs result in the provision of guaranteed service fully responsive with the AGC signals sent 
by the IGO. We also presented the studies to investigate the impacts of changing the duration of 
the cycle offer pattern parameter   for the DAMs so as to bring about the most effective 
utilization of the FES unit. With a 20 MW FES with 5 MWh storage capability in the 2011 
CAISO data case, such utilization results from participation in every other hourly DAM – i.e., a 
cycle of one hour participation followed by one hour of non-participation – to have 12 
consecutive such cycles each day. The simulation study results for this specific case indicate that 
this cycle increases the FES annual revenues by 3.3% over those with the current FES offer 
strategy at full capacity for every hourly DAM. We also studied the impacts of the deployment of 
risk-taking offer strategies into the RTMs. We find that such offer strategies into the RTMs result 
in increases in FES monthly revenues. Specifically, the increase of the RTM capacity in the up 
and down regulation service offers by 63% increases the monthly revenue by nearly 10% over 
the risk-free conservative strategy. A very insightful application of the proposed approach is to 
the analysis of policy issue impacts. Our studies indicate that the mandate of the FERC Order 
No. 764 to introduce shorter DAM subperiods result in improved utilization of storage and in 
increases in revenues for the frequency regulation service provision. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
 
In Section 5.1, we provide a brief synopsis of the work presented in this thesis. In Section 
5.2, we detail directions for future work for the utilization of FES resources in frequency 
regulation service provision. 
 
5.1 Summary 
 
In this thesis we have developed a comprehensive approach to effectively utilize FES 
resources to provide guaranteed AGC service to the grid. The approach makes detailed use of the 
analytic framework we have developed for both analysis and simulation purposes. The 
framework incorporates the regulatory, financial and physical considerations in frequency 
regulation service provision by a FES unit and constructs the analytical basis for the formulation 
of offers into the two sets of markets – the DAMs and the RTMs. The framework has a three-
layer structure – a layer for offer formulation into the hourly DAMs, another layer for additional 
offer formulation into the RTMs and a simulation layer of FES operations in response to the AGC 
signals sent by the system operator into whose system the FES is integrated. The analytic basis in 
the framework allows the determination of the appropriate constraints for use in the formulation 
of the offers for each set of markets. This basis incorporates the modeling of the FES unit 
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developed to appropriately represent its salient physical characteristics with different levels of 
granularity in the three layers. In addition, the representations of the market rules are embedded 
in each layer. The models in the DAM and the RTM layers are able to provide the respective 
boundary limits under worst-case scenario of one type regulation service over the entire duration 
of the period covered by a submitted offer. As a result, the offer is formulated with the full 
assurance that the frequency regulation service can be provided over the entire period associated 
with the offer so as to satisfy all the physical and the regulatory constraints. 
The application of the framework to the formulation of offer strategies makes use of robust 
optimization concepts in the solution of the optimization problem to determine the amount of the 
up and down regulation to offer in each market for each period/subperiod. These solutions 
provide conservative results under which both up and down regulation can be provided with 
100% guarantee independent of what the AGC signal turns out to be and taking into account the 
most up-to-date information on the unit status at the time the offer is submitted. To obtain these 
results, we take full advantage of the distinct considerations in the hourly DAM and in its 
associated RTMs. The offers for each market are made at different times and we use participation 
in the RTM to adaptively correct the accepted offer into its associated DAM by detailed use of the 
updated information on the FES stored energy level. We also investigated the modification of the 
conservative solutions to construct more risky RTM offers and evaluate their performance over a 
range of values of the capacities for regulation up and down service provision. 
We have demonstrated the capability of the developed approach and quantified the 
improved performance over existing techniques through various case studies using the historical 
AGC signal and price data from two large systems – the CAISO and the PJM. The representative 
studies presented in this thesis show that the offer strategies formulated for the FES participation 
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into the DAMs and the RTMs provide guaranteed service fully responsive to the IGO sent AGC 
signals. The specific studies that investigated the impacts of changing the duration of the cyclic 
offer pattern in the DAMs to bring about the best utilization of the FES unit provide important 
insights into the cycle choice. For the 2011 CAISO data case, the best utilization results from 
participation in every other hour’s DAM – i.e., a cycle of one hour participation followed by one 
hour of non-participation – to have 12 consecutive such cycles per day. Indeed, the results 
indicate that this cycle increases the FES annual revenues by 3.3% over those with the current 
FES offer strategy. We also studied the impacts of the deployment of risky offer strategies into 
the RTMs. We find that such offer strategies in the RTMs results in increased FES monthly 
revenues.  
A very insightful application of the proposed approach is to the analysis of policy issues. 
We illustrate such an application through an analysis of the changes promulgated by FERC in its 
Order No. 764 to mandate the partitioning of each hourly DAM period into four 15-minute 
subperiods. Our studies indicate that the shorter subperiods result in improved utilization of the 
storage capability and in increases in revenues for the frequency regulation service over those for 
the hourly periods. These representative results clearly indicate that the proposed approach 
generates offer strategies that result in the better utilization of the FES to provide guaranteed 
frequency regulation service. 
 
5.2 Directions for Future Work 
 
The thesis reported constitutes a good starting point for the future study of additional issues 
related to frequency regulation provision by storage technologies. The ongoing advancements in 
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flywheel technology motivate the parametric study of the sensitivity of the regulation service 
provision with respect to improvements obtainable from capacity and storage capability 
increases of FES units. Such studies can also shed light on the willingness to pay for such 
improvements by the FES owners. 
In light of recent experiences in the deployment of storage devices for frequency regulation 
service provision an interesting extension of the work is the consideration of optimal deployment 
of aggregations of multiple FES units with both uniform and non-uniform characteristics. In 
considering the aggregation of multiple FES units, the important question that is raised, is 
whether it makes sense to cluster the FES units into various subgroups so as to allow their more 
effective utilization for frequency regulation service provision. Such a question can be answered 
as part of a broader problem concerning the effective utilization of a fleet of different storage 
technologies, say, hydro, FES and large-scale batteries. The formulation of an answer to this 
question requires the extension of the framework to include the representation of all the 
technologies of interest. 
Another issue that requires future work is the deployment of the extended framework to 
formulate the appropriate incentives to stimulate the energy storage suppliers to provide 
guaranteed frequency regulation service. Such an investigation needs to formulate appropriate 
payments to the storage resources so as to veer them away from the submission of risky offers to 
provide guaranteed service. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
NOTATION USED IN THE THESIS 
 
 
 
 
For the DAM layer we adapt the convention that the hour h starts at (h-1:00:00)
 +
 and ends 
at h:00:00 and so the hour excludes the point (h-1:00:00) and includes h:00:00. Hence, the hour h 
is represented by semi-open time interval, as shown in Figure A.1. 
 
 
 
Figure А.1: Hourly intervals for the DAM 
 
Each DAM has an hour as the smallest indecomposable unit of time and no phenomena of 
shorter duration may be represented in a DAM. We represent the system by its snapshot whose 
values are assumed to hold for the entire hour. We define the set of H hours 
to denote the collection of the hours for which the DAMs are cleared and the outcomes are 
determined. 
Under the selection of an hour as a smallest indecomposable unit of time, we are unable to 
represent any phenomenon of any duration under an hour. Therefore, we have adopted the 
following protocol: all values on DAM are established at the end of the hour and they are 
assumed to hold over the entire hour (Figure A.1). For example, DAM capacity award   
 h
 (  
 h
) 
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for regulation down (up) is constant for the entire hour h, energy charge  h  is measured at the 
single point in time h :00:00 and assumed to hold over the entire hour h. 
The similar protocol is applicable for the RTM layer, when we consider a subperiod 
k
 as 
the smallest indecomposable unit of time. The variables associated with each RTM are assumed 
to be constant for the entire subperiod 
k
 and subscript (h,
k
) of a variable represents the RTM 
variables. We define the subset of K equal duration subperiods     1 2, , ... ,h K in hour h, 
one for each RTM with duration 
60
K
 minutes in that hour. We adopt the protocol that the 
subperiod k  of hour h starts at (


60( 1)
1 : : 00
k
h
K
)
 +
 and so the subperiod k  excludes the 
point (


60( 1)
1 : : 00
k
h
K
) and includes ( 
60
1 : : 00
k
h
K
). Hence, each subperiod 
 , 1,2, ... , ,
k
k K  is represented by the semi-open time interval that covers the range from 
( 


60( 1)
1 : : 00
k
h
K
)
+
 to ( 
60
1 : : 00
k
h
K
), as we indicate for the semi-open intervals in 
Figure A.2. 
 
 
 
Figure А.2: The subperiods k  for each RTM are semi-open intervals 
 
All values on RTM are established at the end of the subperiod 
 k
 and they are assumed to 
hold over the entire subperiod 
 k
. Thus, energy charge 
, kh
s  is measured at the single point in 
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time ( 
60
1 : : 00
k
h
K
) and assumed to hold over the entire subperiod 
 k
 of hour h, RTM 
capacity award 

  
 , kh
( 

  
 , kh
) for regulation up (down) is constant for the entire subperiod 
k
 of 
hour h. 
We next examine the AGC physical operations layer to effectively represent the AGC 
intervals. The values during real-time operation under AGC are assumed to be constant for the 
entire interval  
 n
. We use the variable 
 n
 in square brackets to denote the variables relating to 
physical operation under AGC. We define a subset of N equal duration intervals 
     , 1 2, ,...,kh N   in subperiod k  of hour h, one for each AGC signal with duration 
3600
KN
 
seconds. 
We adopt the protocol that the interval 
 n
 of subperiod   k  of hour h starts at 
( 
 

60( 1) 3600( 1)
1 : :
k n
h
K KN
)
+
 and ends at (


60( 1) 3600
1 : :
k n
h
K KN
) and so the interval 
 n
 
excludes the point (
 

60( 1) 3600( 1)
1 : :
k n
h
K KN
) and includes (


60( 1) 3600
1 : :
k n
h
K KN
). 
Hence, each interval 
 n
,  1,2, ... , ,n N  is represented by the semi-open time interval that 
covers the range from ( 
 

60( 1) 3600( 1)
1 : :
k n
h
K KN
)
 +
 to (


60( 1) 3600
1 : :
k n
h
K KN
). 
Similarly to RTM and DAM layers, all values relating to physical operations under AGC are 
established at the end of the interval 
 n
 and they are assumed to hold over the entire interval  .
n
 
For example, capacity output 


 ,  
[ ]
kh n
c is assumed to be constant for the entire interval   n , 
energy charge 

 
,
[ ]
kh n
 is measured at the single point in time (


60( 1) 3600
1 : :
k n
h
K KN
) and 
assumed to hold over the entire interval 
n
. Figure A.3 depicts the semi-open intervals 
 n
 of 
physical operations under AGC. 
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Figure A.3: The intervals 
 n
 of physical operations under AGC 
 
Figure A.4 represents the time segments of DAM, RTM and physical operations under AGC 
layers. 
 
 
 
Figure A.4: Time frame for the AGC service in the market environment 
 
 
Key aspects include the following: 
 The elements of each offer have the  ˆ notation 
 All regulation up-related variables/parameters have the superscript “+” 
 All regulation down-related variables/parameters have the superscript “–” 
 We define 
 for regulation up service
†
 for regulation down service 

 

 
 
RTM-related notation (units): 

  †
 , kh
: RTM regulation capacity for subperiod k  in hour h  (MW) 
†
, :kh   RTM regulation capacity price for the subperiod k  in hour h  ($/MW/h) 
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, :kh   RTM regulation mileage price for the subperiod k  in hour h  ($/MW) 


 , kh
: a pre-specified lower bound of s.o.c. at the end of subperiod 
k
 in hour h  (MWh) 


 , kh
: a pre-specified upper bound of s.o.c. at the end of subperiod 
k
 in hour h  (MWh) 
 , kh
s : value of s.o.c. at the end of subperiod k  in hour h (MWh) 
 
DAM-related notation: 
† :h  DAM regulation capacity in hour h  (MW) 
† :h  DAM regulation capacity price in hour h  ($/MW/h) 
 :h  DAM regulation mileage price in hour h  ($/MW) 
  
:
h
e  a pre-specified lower bound of state of charge (s.o.c.) at the end of hour h  (MWh) 
  
:
h
e  a pre-specified upper bound of s.o.c. at the end of hour h  (MWh) 

 h
:  value of s.o.c. at the end of hour h  (MWh) 
 
Physical operations under the AGC-related notation: 
 ,† :Mp  regulation resource maximum capacity output (MW) 
 ,† :mp  regulation minimum capacity offer (MW) 


 ,  
[ ]
kh n
c : regulation resource output in interval 
 n
 of subperiod 
 k
 of hour h (MW) 
 :ME energy charge upper physical limit (MWh) 
 :mE energy charge lower physical limit (MWh) 

 
,
[ ] :
kh n
value of energy charge level at the end of interval 
n
 of subperiod k  in hour h  
 :Mr
 
maximal ramping rate (MW/min)  
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APPENDIX B 
 
THE PROCEDURE TO CALCULATE THE PAYMENT FOR FES 
REGULATION SERVICE PROVISION 
 
 
 
 
We devote this appendix to describe the procedure the IGO is mandated to implement in 
order to calculate the regulation unit’s revenues from participating on regulation DAMs and 
RTMs.  
Compensation to unit providing frequency regulation service is based on regulation 
clearing prices, the unit’s actual performance in response to AGC signal and contractual 
obligations for frequency regulation provision on the DAMs and RTMs. 
The total payment includes following components: 
(i) Cleared capacity payments for the DAMs and RTMs 
(ii) Mileage payments for the DAMs and RTMs 
(iii) Payments or charges for the net energy the unit injects into or 
withdrawals from the system while following the AGC signal 
FERC Order No. 755 establishes the following procedure to calculate every component of 
compensation: 
1. The payment for capacity of the delivered frequency regulation service is 
compensation to the FES for the capacity range which the unit made available to operate under 
AGC. This payment depends on the number of AGC intervals, when the unit was responsive to 
the AGC signal. Note, that FES is not able to respond to the AGC signal if the unit hits its upper 
or lower stored energy limit. The total payment for capacity of the delivered frequency 
regulation service consists of two parts. The first one is based on the DAM clearing price, and the 
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second is based on the RTM clearing price, as illustrated in Figure B.1. Let us first consider the 
RTM component.  
At any subperiod 
k
, we need to know how many AGC intervals the FES was not able to 
respond to AGC signal due to the low charge level. We define an indicator function 


,  
[ ]
kh n
i 

 by 


 

 
 

 
 ,  
,  
1 if [ ]
[ ]
0 otherwise
k
k
m
h n
h n
E
i 
  
Similarly, we define a function 


,  
[ ]
kh n
i 

 to indicate the AGC intervals when FES was not 
able to respond to AGC signal due to hitting the upper level of stored energy: 


 

 
 

 
 ,  
,  
1 if [ ]
[ ]
0 otherwise
k
k
M
h n
h n
E
i 
  
Then, the payment  h  for capacity of the delivered frequency regulation service for 
KRTMs in hour h can be defined as: 
 
,  ,  
    1 1
  ,  ,  ,  ,
1
[ ] [ ]
1 1  
k k
k k k k
N N
h n h nK
n n
h h h h h
k
i i
N N
 
   
 
    
 
    

    
    
       
    
        
 

 
 
   
 
 
Similarly, the payment  h  for capacity of the delivered frequency regulation service for 
DAM obligations fulfillment in hour h can be defined as: 
 
,  ,  
    1 1 1 1
     
[ ] [ ]
 1   1
k k
K N K N
h n h n
k n k n
h h h h h
i i
NK NK
  
    
 
      
   
   
      
   
      
   
  
 
As a result, the total payment for capacity of the delivered frequency regulation service for 
a day d includes the payments which come from the contractual obligation to provide regulation 
service on hourly DAMs and associated RTMs and is given as 
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   
1
H
h h
h
  

 
 
 
 
Figure B.1: Capacity payment based on the RTM and the DAM clearing outcomes 
 
2. Under the FERC Order No. 755, every regulation unit must be compensated for the 
actual change in output between two consecutive AGC signal responses. The FERC Order No. 
755 also refers to this component as a mileage payment. Since FERC does not provide exact 
guidance on how to calculate mileage payments, every IGO has established its own mileage 
compensation scheme. Reference [39] provides the detailed analysis of the IGOs policies and in 
this thesis we use the more general approach presented in [43].  
The mileage payment is based on absolute change of the unit’s output , [ ]kh nc    between 
two consecutive   intervals as depicted in Figure B.2. In other words, this payment 
compensates the regulation unit for actual capacity movements in response to the AGC signal 
instruction. So, if the unit participates only on DAM or RTM, then the mileage compensation is 
paid at the DAM or RTM clearing price. For general cases, when the unit is cleared both on DAM 
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and RTM for the frequency regulation provision, mileage payment consists of two components 
paid at the DAM and RTM clearing prices, respectively. Specifically, all the capacity movements 
which are between DAM up 
 
 h

 and down 
 
 h

 cleared capacities are compensated based on 
DAM clearing price  h :  
 
   
   
  
  ,    ,  1
  
  
1 1
  ,    ,  1
   0,     [ ]    0,     [ ]
 
 0,  [ ]   0,  [ ]
k k
k k
K N h h n h h n
h h
k n
h h n h h n
max c max c
max c max c
 
 
   
 
   
 

 
 

    
 
 
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 

 
Additionally, all movements above 
 
 h

 and below 
 
 h

 are considered as RTM mileage 
and are paid at the RTM mileage clearing price  , kh  : 
   
   
  
  ,    ,  1
  ,  ,   ,  1
  
1 1
  ,    ,  1
max 0,  [ ] max 0,  [ ]
[ ] [ ]
max 0,  [ ] max 0,  [ ]
k k
k k k
k k
K N h h n h h n
h h h n h n
k n
h h n h h n
c c
c c
c c
 
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 
   
   
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 


 
 

     
    
  
       
  
   
 
 
Figure B.2: Mileage payment calculation  
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The total mileage payment for a day d is presented as follows: 
 
   
1
  
H
h h
h
  

   
 
3. In Order No. 755 the FERC mandated all IGOs to compensate or charge resources 
providing frequency regulation service for the net energy injected or withdrawn while following 
AGC signal commands. It is important to note that IGOs policies have different energy 
compensation schemes. For example, CAISO and PJM pay or charge the net energy at the real-
time LMP only. As a justification of their approach, they claim that their revenues come mostly 
from payments for regulation provision, but not from energy arbitrage. In this thesis we have 
adopted a more general compensation scheme. In particular, the FES is paid or charged for the 
net energy injected or withdrawn at the hourly LMP if the resource’s output is between DAM up 
 
 h

 and down 
 
 h

 cleared capacities. On the other hand, if the resource’s output is above 
 
 h

 
or below 
 
 h

, then the energy generated or consumed is considered as an RTM transaction and is 
compensated or charged at the real-time LMP as designated by right-directed hatching under the 
AGC signal on Figure B.3. 
In order to distinguish between these two cases, we use an approach similar to the one we 
have used for mileage calculation. Hence, the energy payment or charges in hour h can be 
defined as 
 
     
     
  
 ,    ,   
  
1 1
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1 1
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K N
h n h h n h
h h
k n
K N
h n h h n h h
h
k n
c c
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c c
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 
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
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 
    

 
 
  
 
 
 
  


 
 
 
where  h  is an hourly LMP in hour h at the bus, connected to FES,  , kh   is a real-time LMP at 
subperiod k  in hour h at the same bus. 
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Figure B.3: Net energy payment 
 
  
70 
 
APPENDIX C 
OVERVIEW OF THE SIMULATION APPROACH  
 
 
 
 
The overview of market simulation algorithm for day d is shown on Figure C.1 
For each day d in the simulation period, we first determine the regulation DAM offers 
which have resulted from solving the optimization problem , . This DAM 
schedule information is the input to the real-time offer problem 

( )
h k
 . The outcome of the 
RTM offer problem 

( )
h k
  consists of the capacity offers in up and down directions for real-
time subperiod k . Assuming FES price-taking behavior in DAM and RTM, all real-time and 
day-ahead regulation offers are cleared as submitted. Hence, the market clearing results define 
the contribution of total AGC service which the regulation unit is obligated to provide [44]. 
Therefore, the AGC curve is normalized based on combined DAM and RTM capacity rewards. 
The simulated AGC signal determines the unit’s stored energy at the end of subperiod k  which 
is the same as the energy at the beginning of subperiod 1k  . The process is repeated for each 
real-time subperiod k h   and for every hour  h  . From day d day-ahead and real-time 
offers, regulation unit’s actual performance, and regulation service clearing prices we calculate 
the FES capacity, mileage and energy payments using the settlement scheme presented in 
Appendix B. These figures form the basis of an economic assessment and comparative analysis 
of DAM and RTM offer strategies. 
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Figure C.1: Day-ahead and real-time offer strategies simulation algorithm 
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